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Abstract
Inspired by the Chinese experience, we develop a Schumpeterian growth model of
distance to frontier in which economic growth in the developing country is driven by
domestic innovation as well as imitation and transfer of foreign technologies through
foreign direct investment. We show that optimal intellectual property rights (IPR)
protection is stage-dependent. At an early stage of development, the country imple-
ments weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation. At a later stage of development, the
country implements strong IPR protection to encourage domestic innovation. We also
calibrate the model to aggregate data of the Chinese economy to simulate the optimal
path of patent strength, which is increasing as the country evolves towards the world
technology frontier, and this dynamic pattern is consistent with the actual evolution of
the patent system in China. Furthermore, we use a dynamic panel regression model to
provide empirical evidence that supports the key implication of our theoretical model.
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"China and others are entering the tricky middle-income stage of development in
which the big advances from absorbing rich-world technology start to run out."
The Economist (2011)1
1 Introduction
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the implementation of a modern intellectual property
rights (IPR) system in China was subject to intense debates.2 Proponents including Deng
Xiaopeng, the paramount leader of China at that time, saw the creation of a modern IPR
system in China as a necessary means to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) and to
provide incentives for domestic innovation. In 1982, the rst intellectual property law under
the leadership of Deng was drafted in China. Then, through a series of policy reforms, the
strength of patent rights in China increased over time. For example, the Ginarte-Park index
of patent rights in China gradually increased from 1.33 in 1985 to 4.08 in 2005.3 In 1992,
the statutory term of patent in China was lengthened from 15 years to 20 years.4 Then, in
compliance with the TRIPS agreement,5 China reformed its patent system again in 2000.6
Recently, the Third Amendment to the Chinese Patent Law was approved in December 2008
and came into e¤ect in October 2009 with the objective of building China into an innovative
country with well-protected IPR by 2020.7 Following these patent reforms, research and
development (R&D) as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in China increased
from 0.7% in 1992 to 1.7% in 2009.8 As for the inow of FDI to China, it increases from
1The Economist, "The world economy: Catching up is very hard to do". September 24th - 30th, 2011.
2See for example Allison and Lin (1999) and La Croix and Konan (2002) for a discussion on the historical
development of IPR in China.
3The Ginarte-Park index is on a scale of 0 to 5, and a larger number implies stronger patent rights. See
Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008a) for a detailed description of this patent index.
4As for the term of patent for utility model and design patents, it was lengthened from 5 years to 10
years. Also, this patent reform expanded patentable subject matter in China.
5The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) is an agreement of
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In summary, TRIPS establishes a minimum level of IPR protection
that must be provided by all member countries.
6The policy changes include (a) providing patentholders with the right to obtain a preliminary injunction
against the infringing party before ling a lawsuit, (b) stipulating standards to compute statutory damages,
(c) a¢ rming that state and non-state enterprises enjoy equal patent rights, and (d) simplifying the patent
application process, examination and transfer procedures and unifying the appeal system. See for example
Hu and Je¤erson (2009) for an empirical analysis of this patent reform in China.
7See for example Yang and Yen (2010) for a review of the policy changes in this third amendment. In
summary, the changes aim at (a) promoting patent applications, (b) encouraging exploitation of jointly owned
patents, (c) heightening patentability requirement, (d) increasing statutory damages and administrative nes,
(e) clarifying the granting of compulsory licenses, and (f) establishing protection for genetic resources.
8See Hu and Je¤erson (2009) who show that the patent reform in 2000 is a major factor for explaining
the increase in patenting activities in China.
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US$11 billion in 1992 to US$185 billion in 2010.9
In addition to strengthening patent rights, China also improved the protection for trade
secrets by developing a comprehensive set of laws and regulations over the last two decades.10
In a recent report issued by NERA Economic Consulting, Sepetys and Cox (2009, p. 3) nicely
summarize the evolution of IPR in China as follows.
In the early stages of development, with limited resources and limited ca-
pacity for research and development, there may be little or no IPR protection.
Domestic industry will be characterized by imitation rather than innovation. Im-
itation allows for low-cost production, low prices for goods and services, and the
stimulation of consumption and employment. A weak IPR regime may support
technological growth and development through imitation in early stages of de-
velopment. At subsequent stages of development, however, a weak IPR regime
discourages domestic innovation. Innovation and technological development are
drivers of economic growth. Economies that succeed in shifting into knowledge-
based production are characterized by domestic innovation, typically supported
with well-designed and adequately enforced IPR laws.
In this study, we develop a growth-theoretic model to formalize this insight on the evo-
lution of IPR in developing countries using China as a timely example. For example, one
objective of Chinas twelfth ve-year plan (2011-2015) is to shift its reliance on foreign tech-
nology to domestic innovation. A recent study by Li (2010) provides an interesting case-study
analysis on the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries to demonstrate that China is
in the process of transforming from an imitation-oriented economy to an innovation-oriented
economy and that strengthening patent rights can play an important role in facilitating this
transformation process. This nding is consistent with the implication of our analysis.
To analyze stage-dependent IPR for a developing country at di¤erent stages of develop-
ment, we consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier in which economic
growth in the developing country is driven by domestic innovation as well as imitation and
transfer of foreign technologies through FDI. We show that the model features an inverted-
U e¤ect of patent strength on domestic innovation under a certain parameter space. The
intuition is as follows. On the one hand, increasing patent strength has a positive e¤ect on
domestic innovation by reducing imitation. On the other hand, the reduction in imitation
leads to an increase in FDI that strengthens the displacement e¤ect of foreign technologies
on domestic innovation. As for the growth-maximizing and welfare-maximizing strengths of
9Data from the World Development Indicators.
10See for example Zuber (2008) for a discussion on the protection of trade secrets in China and the US.
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IPR protection, we show that they are stage-dependent. At an early stage of development,
the country implements weak IPR protection to facilitate imitation of foreign technologies.
At a later stage of development, the country implements strong IPR protection to encourage
domestic innovation. We also calibrate the model to aggregate data of the Chinese economy
to simulate the optimal path of patent strength, which is increasing as the country evolves
towards the world technology frontier, and this result is consistent with the actual evolution
of the patent system in China. Finally, we test the implication of our theoretical model using
a dynamic panel regression model. We nd that IPR protection has both positive and neg-
ative e¤ects on economic growth, and the positive growth e¤ect of IPR strengthens relative
to the negative growth e¤ect as a country evolves towards the technology frontier.
This study relates to the literature on IPR and economic growth. This literature focuses
on an important issue that is optimal IPR protection. An early study by Nordhaus (1969)
nds that the optimal patent length should balance the static distortionary e¤ect of markup
pricing and the dynamic gain from enhanced innovation. In a dynamic general-equilibrium
model, Judd (1985) nds that the optimal patent length is innite while Iwaisako and Fu-
tagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) nd that the optimal patent length can
be nite in a version of the Romer model. Kwan and Lai (2003) show that extending the
e¤ective lifetime of patent would lead to a substantial increase in R&D and welfare whereas
Li (2001) and ODonoghue and Zweimuller (2004) consider the e¤ects of patent breadth on
R&D and economic growth. Dinopoulos and Syropoulos (2007) and Davis and Sener (2012)
analyze the e¤ects of rent protection activities on innovation. Chu (2009) and Chu et al.
(2012) analyze the e¤ects of blocking patents on R&D and welfare. Recently, Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012) consider optimal state-dependent patent protection based on the endogenous
technological gap between the leader and followers in an industry. However, this literature
rarely considers optimal IPR protection in developing countries in which economic growth is
driven by imitation and transfer of foreign technologies in addition to domestic innovation.
We ll this gap in the literature by analyzing the optimal strength of IPR protection in a
developing country at di¤erent stages of economic development.
Our study also relates to the literature on IPR and North-South product cycles.11 A key
question in this literature is whether strengthening Southern IPR protection stimulates or
sties Northern innovation. Grossman and Helpman (1991) nd that strengthening Southern
IPR protection either has no e¤ect or a negative e¤ect on Northern innovation.12 Lai (1998)
11See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991), Helpman (1993), Lai (1998), Yang and Maskus (2001),
Glass and Saggi (2002a, 2002b), Glass and Wu (2007), Tanaka et al. (2007), Parello (2008), Dinopoulos and
Segerstrom (2010), Branstetter and Saggi (2011) and Iwaisako et al. (2011).
12Grossman and Helpman (1991) consider a tax (subsidy) on imitation that decreases (increases) Southern
imitation, which is similar to the e¤ects of IPR protection.
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shows that whether Southern IPR protection has a positive or negative e¤ect on Northern
innovation depends on the mode of technology transfer (i.e., imitation versus FDI) whereas
Glass and Wu (2007) argue that the e¤ect also depends on the type of technological inno-
vation (i.e., quality improvement versus variety expansion). Instead of analyzing the e¤ects
of Southern IPR protection on Northern innovation, the present study considers a much less
explored issue that is optimal IPR protection in the South as a function of its technology
distance from the North.
An inuential study by Grossman and Lai (2004) considers globally optimal IPR protec-
tion in an open-economy model featuring both developed and developing countries that have
asymmetric innovative capability and market size. The present study di¤ers from Gross-
man and Lai (2004) by considering a model in which (a) economic growth in the developing
country is driven by both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer and (b) the
relative importance of innovation and technology transfer changes endogenously as the coun-
try evolves towards the world technology frontier. These two features together imply that
optimal IPR protection should be stage-dependent, which is an important property that is
absent in all the abovementioned studies.
Finally, this paper relates mostly to studies on distance to frontier and convergence; see
Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005), Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005), Ben-
habib et al. (2012) and Gersbach et al. (2012). Our paper extends these inuential studies
by endogenizing an important economic institution that is the IPR system and analyzing
how it evolves as an economy develops towards the world technology frontier.13 Further-
more, we consider innovation and multiple channels of foreign technology transfer through
imitation and FDI that are key features of the Chinese economy.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical model.
Section 3 analyzes stage-dependent IPR protection and considers an extension of the baseline
model. Section 4 presents empirical results. The nal section concludes with a discussion.
2 A simple model of distance to frontier
We consider a Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier.14 The discrete-time
model has four components (a) individuals, (b) nal goods, (c) intermediate goods, and (d)
13Wu (2010) also considers the e¤ects of IPR protection in a Schumpeterian model of distance to frontier.
While Wu (2010) focuses on the existence of non-convergence traps, our study di¤ers from his interesting
analysis by characterizing the optimal path of IPR protection in developing countries.
14Our model borrows many elements from other Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, such as
Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006), Aghion et al. (2005) and Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005).
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R&D. In each period, there is a unit continuum of risk-neutral individuals indexed by j.
Each individual j lives for one period, supplies one unit of labor and consumes nal goods
to maximize expected utility. To facilitate tractable aggregation of social welfare, we follow
a common specication in the literature to consider linear utility given by ujt = E[c
j
t ], where
cjt denotes consumption by individual j. Labor supply is used as an input for nal goods,
which can be consumed by individuals, devoted to various types of R&D activities or used
as an input for intermediate goods. To model the e¤ects of IPR, we consider a specic
IPR parameter t that captures the e¤ects of patent protection on imitation, which in turn
a¤ects FDI and innovation. This setup captures the main concerns of policymakers in China.
A key di¤erence between our model and the models in Acemoglu et al. (2003, 2006) is
in our formulation of the interaction between imitation of foreign technologies and domestic
innovation in the developing country. In previous studies, imitation and innovation in an in-
dustry are assumed to be performed by the same rm implying that the interaction between
imitation and innovation lies in the resource allocation across the two types of activities
within a rm. In contrast, in our model, imitation and innovation in an industry are per-
formed by two di¤erent rms capturing the realistic scenario in which domestic innovation in
the developing country can be displaced by the importation of more advanced foreign tech-
nologies. In other words, our framework captures both the positive spillover e¤ect and the
negative market-stealing e¤ect of foreign technologies on domestic technologies commonly
discussed in the empirical literature on technology di¤usion.15
Another key di¤erence is that we take into consideration two channels of foreign tech-
nology transfer (a) FDI and (b) imitation. Within this framework, a stronger patent system
makes imitation of foreign technologies more di¢ cult. Consequently, the lower intensity of
imitation improves the incentives for technology transfer via FDI, and this theoretical nd-
ing is consistent with empirical evidence.16 As for the e¤ects of stronger patent protection
on domestic innovation, there are a direct positive e¤ect from the decrease in imitation and
an indirect negative e¤ect from the increase in FDI (i.e., the displacement e¤ect of foreign
technologies on domestic innovation). Therefore, our model features an inverted-U e¤ect
of patent strength on domestic innovation that has been documented in recent empirical
studies, such as Lerner (2009) and Qian (2007).17
15See for example Aitken and Harrison (1999).
16An early study by Lee and Manseld (1996) nds a positive e¤ect of IPR on FDI. Although subsequent
studies produce mixed results, recent empirical studies tend to nd a positive e¤ect. For example, Javorcik
(2004) nds that IPR has a positive e¤ect on FDI in technology-intensive sectors of transition economies.
Considering a more comprehensive set of countries, Branstetter et al. (2006) also nd that strengthening
IPR has a positive e¤ect on technology transfer.
17See also Akiyama and Furukawa (2009), Furukawa (2007, 2010), Horii and Iwaisako (2007) Iwaisako and
Futagami (2011), and Chu et al. (2012), who derive an inverted-U relationship between patent strength and
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In the model, we consider a specic sequence of actions by domestic innovators, foreign
rms and domestic imitators. In particular, we assume that domestic innovation is followed
by FDI and then imitation. This specic sequence of actions gives rise to the two important
and realistic implications discussed above. First, domestic innovation may be displaced by
foreign technologies. Second, a strengthening of patent protection that reduces imitation
may encourage both domestic innovation and foreign technology transfer supporting the
abovementioned rationales for implementing a modern IPR system in China.
Finally, as in previous studies, we assume that there is no trade in factors of production
and the developing country takes the world technology frontier as given.18 A slight modi-
cation from previous studies is that we allow for trade in nal goods, so that foreign rms
that perform FDI can retrieve their monopolistic prots out of the developing country.
2.1 Final goods
This sector is perfectly competitive, and rms take the output and input prices as given.
Final goods Yt (chosen as the numeraire) are produced by combining labor input with a unit
continuum of di¤erentiated intermediate goods Xt(i) indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. We consider a
standard production function.
Yt = L
1 
t
Z 1
0
A1 t (i)X

t (i)di, (1)
where At(i) is the level of technology associated with Xt(i). The supply of labor Lt is
normalized to unity for all t. The conditional demand function for Xt(i) is
Xt(i) = At(i) [=Pt(i)]
1=(1 ) , (2)
where Pt(i) is the price of Xt(i) for i 2 [0; 1].
2.2 Intermediate goods and domestic innovation
There is a unit continuum of intermediate goods indexed by i 2 [0; 1], and each industry i is
dominated by a temporary monopolistic leader. In each industry, an individual is randomly
chosen as the entrepreneur, who is given the opportunity to innovate at the beginning of the
period and potentially dominate the industry for the remaining period. In the next period, all
innovation in the R&D-based growth model via other mechanisms.
18See section 5 for a discussion of this assumption.
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relevant patents expire and the monopolistic position will be randomly assigned to another
entrepreneur who performs the next innovation. This simple setup, which is in line with other
Schumpeterian models of distance to frontier, simplies the model by equating the return
to R&D to the monopolistic prot in the current period, and this simplication allows us to
focus on the dynamic aspects of distance to frontier. For each monopolist, producing one
unit of intermediate goods requires one unit of nal goods. The familiar prot-maximizing
price is Pt(i) = 1=.19 Therefore, using (2), we can derive the amount of monopolistic prot
as
t(i) = Pt(i)Xt(i) Xt(i) = At(i), (3)
where   (1  )(1+)=(1 ) is a composite parameter.
At the beginning of time t, the level of productivity in industry i is At 1(i). An entrepre-
neur is given the opportunity to increase the level of productivity to eAt(i) = (1+ t)At 1(i),
where t is the step size of innovation that is a choice variable.
20 The expected return to
innovation in industry i is (1   pt)[ eAt(i)   At 1(i)] = (1   pt)tAt 1(i), where pt 2 [0; 1]
is the endogenous probability (to be derived below) that the monopolistic position will be
taken away either by a foreign rm or by a domestic imitator before production in this
period begins. When this probability pt is high, the entrepreneur only has a small chance
of capturing the monopolistic prot and has less incentives to do R&D. This setup relates
to the idea of intellectual appropriability discussed in Cozzi (2001) and Cozzi and Spinesi
(2006). Under this interpretation, pt can be viewed as the probability that the monopolistic
position is stolen by another entrepreneur before the innovator manages to start production.
To increase the level of technology by a step size of t in industry i, the entrepreneur
has to devote Rt(i) units of nal goods to R&D. We consider a simple convex cost function
given by
Rt(i) =
(t)


At 1(i), (4)
where  is a productivity parameter and  > 2.21 In (4), the scaling by At 1(i) is common in
the literature to capture increasing di¢ culty in innovation and to ensure a stationary t on
the balanced-growth path. The expected prot of R&D is (1 pt)tAt 1(i) Rt(i). Simple
19In line with the standard treatment in this class of models, we assume that the monopolist of an industry
is always able to charge the unconstrained monopoly price.
20It is useful to note that although a domestically invented technology may not be as advanced as foreign
technologies, it was nevertheless patentable in China before its third amendment to patent laws when the
novelty requirement for a patentable invention required only local novelty within China. After the recent
passage of this third amendment, patentability in China is now based on global novelty. Nevertheless,
domestic innovators may invent locally adapted inventions that are "su¢ ciently" di¤erent from foreign
inventions and patentable in China.
21This parameter assumption  > 2 ensures that the equilibrium growth rate is concave in pt, so that the
growth-maximizing level of patent protection is an interior solution.
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di¤erentiation yields the equilibrium step size of innovation given by
t = [(1  pt)]1=( 1) (5)
for i 2 [0; 1]. Equation (5) shows that an increase in pt reduces the incentives for innovation
and decreases t.
Proposition 1 Weaker intellectual appropriability (i.e., a larger pt) decreases the equilib-
rium step size of domestic innovation.
2.3 Foreign direct investment
After the domestic entrepreneurs complete their R&D projects and before they sell their
products, foreign rms may transfer recent technological developments from the world tech-
nology frontier to the developing country. This transfer of foreign technologies via FDI is
a random process. If the process is successful in industry i, then the foreign rm takes
away the monopolistic position from the domestic entrepreneur in that industry.22 Before
this process of technology transfer begins, the level of productivity in industry i at time t iseAt(i) = (1 + t)At 1(i). If the technology transfer succeeds, then productivity in industry i
further increases to bAt(i) = eAt(i) + gAt 1. (6)
At 1 is the level of technology at the world technology frontier at time t   1 and evolves
according to
At = (1 + g
)At 1, (7)
where g is the exogenous growth rate of the world technology frontier. In other words, (6)
considers the case in which the domestic economy imports newly developed frontier technolo-
gies from abroad.23 Although newly developed technologies represent an important source
of technology transfer to developing countries, it is conceivable that previously developed
22In an earlier version of this paper, we also consider the case in which the domestic innovators may
strategically choose a more drastic innovation to deter the entry of foreign rms; see section 5.2 of Chu et
al. (2011).
23An example is telecommunications. Although mobile phones represent a more advanced technology
than xed-line phones, mobile phones have become widespread in China before xed-line phones ever have a
chance to do so. In China, the number of mobile-phone subscribers is now more than double the number of
xed-line subscribers. According to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, China has about
300 million xed-line subscribers and 800 million mobile-phone subscribers in 2010.
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technologies that have not been adopted by developing countries also represent another im-
portant source of technology transfer. Therefore, we will explore this extension in section
3.2.
The expected value of a successful transfer of foreign technologies via FDI in industry i
is (1   ts) bAt(i), where t 2 [0; 1] is the probability that the transferred technologies will
be imitated by a domestic rm in which case the foreign rm has to give away a share
s 2 [0; 1] of the market to the domestic imitator (to be discussed further below). To achieve
a successful FDI project with probability ft in industry i, the foreign rm has to devote Ft(i)
units of nal goods. For analytical simplicity, we consider a quadratic cost function given by
Ft(i) =
(ft)
2
2f
bAt(i), (8)
where f is a productivity parameter. The expected prot of FDI is ft(1  ts) bAt(i) Ft(i).
Simple di¤erentiation yields the equilibrium intensity of FDI given by
ft = (1  ts)f 2 [0; 1] (9)
for i 2 [0; 1].24 Equation (9) shows that either a larger probability of imitation t or a larger
share s of the market to be given away to the imitator reduces the incentives for technology
transfer via FDI.
Proposition 2 A higher rate of imitation (i.e., a larger t) reduces the intensity of FDI.
2.4 Imitation and intellectual property rights
After the foreign rms complete their process of technology transfer, the domestic economy
consists of two types of industries that are occupied by either (a) domestic innovators or
(b) foreign rms. In the case of (a), another domestic individual is randomly chosen as an
imitator, who has the ability to adapt the more advanced foreign technologies from other
industries. We refer to this type of imitation as e¢ cient imitation et.25 In the case of (b), a
domestic individual is randomly chosen as an imitator, who has the ability to imitate existing
foreign technologies in the industry. We refer to this type of imitation as ine¢ cient imitation
t.26 Both types of imitation are random. If the imitation process is successful, then the
24A parameter condition (P1) to be stated below will ensure that ft < 1.
25We call this e¢ cient imitation because it raises the level of technology in the industry.
26We call this ine¢ cient imitation because it contributes nothing to the industrys level of technology.
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imitator takes away (a) the monopolistic position from the domestic innovator in the case
of e¢ cient imitation et or (b) some market share s 2 [0; 1] from the foreign rm in the case
of ine¢ cient imitation t.27 For s = 0, the imitator is unable to take away any market share
from the foreign rm. For s = 1, the imitator takes away the entire market share from the
foreign rm. The general case of s 2 (0; 1) captures the scenario, in which the foreign rm
and the domestic imitator collude and share the monopolistic prot as in Segerstrom (1991).
Under this general case, the domestic imitator is able to take away some market share from
the foreign rm because domestic rms often have a competitive advantage over foreign rms
through local knowledge and local network in developing countries. For example, Branstetter
et al. (2006) note that when a foreign rm "...transfers this knowledge to local employees,
there is a risk that these employees will defect to a local manufacturer, taking sensitive
technology with them. These employees are able to combine the patented and unpatented
elements of the rmstechnology, e¤ectively competing with it in the local market."
The return to e¢ cient imitation is  bAt(i). To achieve an e¢ cient imitation with proba-
bility et in industry i, the imitator has to devote Et(i) units of nal goods to imitative R&D.
Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost function given by
Et(i) = t
(et)
2
2e
bAt(i), (10)
where e is a productivity parameter for e¢ cient imitation and t 2 (0;1) is a policy variable
determining the level of patent protection at time t. This formulation captures the idea that
a stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) makes imitation more di¢ cult and
potentially improves intellectual appropriability by domestic innovators. The expected prot
from e¢ cient imitation is et bAt(i) Et(i). Simple di¤erentiation yields the probability of a
successful e¢ cient imitation in industry i given by
et = minfe=t; 1g (11)
for i 2 [0; 1].
The return to ine¢ cient imitation is s bAt(i). To achieve an ine¢ cient imitation with
probability t in industry i, the imitator has to devote It(i) units of nal goods to imitative
27Similarly, we can also introduce another prot-sharing parameter between domestic innovators and
domestic imitators without changing our main results. However, we think it is more natural for the domestic
imitators, who have imitated the more advanced foreign technologies from other industries, to force out the
domestic innovators who possess less advanced technologies.
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R&D. Again, we consider a simple quadratic cost function given by
It(i) = t
(t)
2
2
bAt(i), (12)
where  is a productivity parameter for ine¢ cient imitation. This formulation captures the
idea that a stronger system of patent protection makes the imitation of foreign technologies
more di¢ cult and improves intellectual appropriability by foreign rms. The expected prot
is ts bAt(i)   It(i). Simple di¤erentiation yields the probability of a successful ine¢ cient
imitation in industry i given by
t = minfs=t; 1g (13)
for i 2 [0; 1].
Proposition 3 A stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) reduces both types
of imitation.
Proposition 3 shows that stronger patent protection reduces both e¢ cient and ine¢ cient
imitations. The reduction in ine¢ cient imitation increases foreign technology transfer via
FDI from Proposition 2. As for domestic innovation, stronger patent protection has a direct
positive e¤ect by reducing e¢ cient imitation and an indirect negative e¤ect by increasing
FDI. In (5), the probability pt is given by ft + (1   ft)et. In other words, at the time
of innovation, a domestic innovator may be subsequently displaced by a foreign rm with
probability ft or by a domestic imitator with probability (1   ft)et. Di¤erentiating pt =
ft + (1  ft)et with respect to t yields
@pt
@t
= (1  et) @ft
@t
>0
+ (1  ft) @et
@t
<0
. (14)
Equation (14) shows that a larger t increases pt through ft (i.e., the displacement e¤ect of
foreign technologies) and decreases pt through et (i.e., the direct e¤ect of reducing domestic
imitation). Applying (9), (11) and (13), we nd that
@pt
@t
< 0() t > 1
2s

s2
e
  1  f
f

. (15)
Recall that domestic innovation t is decreasing in pt from Proposition 1. Therefore, if
and only if (15) holds, then patent strength t would have a monotonically positive e¤ect
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on domestic innovation t. In other words, for a su¢ ciently small t (or equivalently, a
su¢ ciently large t), it is possible for @t=@t to become negative (i.e., @pt=@t > 0)
implying an inverted-U e¤ect of t on domestic innovation t. The negative e¤ect of patent
protection on domestic innovation arises from the displacement e¤ect of foreign technology
transfer via FDI.
For a developing country, it is unlikely that the level of patent protection has reached this
level.28 Therefore, we impose the following su¢ cient condition to ensure that @t=@t > 0
for t 2 (0;1). This parameter condition is given by
f <
1
(1 + s2=e)
, (P1)
which in turn implies f < 1=.29 For the rest of the analysis, we assume that (P1) holds,
so that the e¤ect of patent protection on domestic innovation is monotonically positive.
However, due to its negative e¤ect on technology transfer through imitation, we will show
that the overall e¤ect of patent protection on economic growth follows an inverted-U shape
that is consistent with recent empirical evidence as discussed before.
Proposition 4 A stronger system of patent protection (i.e., a larger t) raises FDI intensity
ft. If (P1) holds, then a stronger system of patent protection also has a positive e¤ect on
domestic innovation in the developing country.
For a given level of technology in an industry, (8) shows that a larger ft also raises the
amount of FDI. This nding is consistent with the time series behavior of FDI and patent
strength in China as discussed in the introduction.
2.5 Aggregation
At the beginning of time t, the level of technology is industry i is At 1(i). Then, the domestic
innovator increases the level of technology to eAt(i). After that, if either a foreign rm or
a domestic imitator succeeds in transferring foreign technologies into industry i, then the
level of technology would further increase to bAt(i). The transfer of foreign technologies
28See for example Park (2008b) for a survey of empirical studies on patent strength and innovation. Upon
surveying the empirical literature, Park (2008b) concludes that although an inverted-U e¤ect of patent
strength on innovation is theoretically plausible, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the level of patent
protection in most countries is still on the upward-sloping side of the curve.
29This condition is su¢ cient for ft < 1 in (9).
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succeeds with probability ft while the e¢ cient imitation of foreign technologies succeeds
with probability et. Using the law of large numbers, we derive the following law of motion
for aggregate technology At 
R
At(i)di in the developing country.
At = [ft + (1  ft)et]gAt 1 + (1 + t)At 1. (16)
Intuitively, (16) states that the industries experience an average productivity improvement by
tAt 1 through domestic innovation and a fraction ft+(1 ft)et of the industries experiences
an additional productivity improvement by gAt 1 through either FDI or e¢ cient imitation.
The aggregate production function can be obtained by substituting Pt(i) = 1= and (2)
into (1) to derive
Yt = At, (17)
where   2=(1 ) is a composite parameter. The resource constraint for nal goods is
Yt = Ct +Xt +Rt + Et + It + Ft +NXt, (18)
where (a) Ct is aggregate consumption, (b) Xt is the total amount of nal goods used in the
production of intermediate goods, (c) Rt is aggregate innovative R&D, (d) Et is aggregate
expenditure on e¢ cient imitation, (e) It is aggregate expenditure on ine¢ cient imitation, (f)
Ft is aggregate expenditure on FDI, and (g) NXt is net export. Using Pt(i) = 1= and (2),
we obtain
Xt = 
2=(1 )At. (19)
From (4), aggregate innovative R&D is
Rt =
(t)


At 1. (20)
From (10), aggregate expenditure on e¢ cient imitation is
Et = (1  ft)t (et)
2
2e
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (21)
From (12), aggregate expenditure on ine¢ cient imitation is
It = ftt
(t)
2
2
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (22)
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From (8), aggregate expenditure on FDI is
Ft =
(ft)
2
2f
[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (23)
As for the net export of nal goods, it is given by
NXt =

ft(1  ts)   (ft)
2
2f

[(1 + t)At 1 + g
At 1]. (24)
In other words, the domestic economy exports goods to pay for the monopolistic prots (net
of FDI expenditure) earned by foreign rms. Finally, aggregate consumption is
Ct = (1  2)At   (Rt + Et + It + Ft +NXt). (25)
2.6 Convergence
If we dene at  At=At as an inverse measure of the developing countrys distance to the
world technology frontier, then the law of motion for at is
at = [ft + (1  ft)et]

g
1 + g

+

1 + t
1 + g

at 1  H(at 1). (26)
Equation (26) is plotted in Figure 1 for a constant value of .
Figure 1 - Convergence and Distance to Frontier
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In this case, at converges to a unique steady-state value given by
a =
f + (1  f)e
1  =g . (27)
To ensure that a 2 (0; 1), we naturally assume30
g >

1  p =
()1=( 1)
(1  p)( 2)=( 1) , (P2)
where p = f + (1  f)e. At the steady state, the developing country grows at the same rate
as the world technology frontier despite the fact that the step size of domestic innovation  is
smaller than g. However, if the developing country fails to obtain foreign technologies (i.e.,
f = e = 0), then it would diverge from the rest of the world because domestic innovation
alone is insu¢ cient for the country to catch up with the world technology frontier. Further-
more, (27) shows that stronger patent protection has opposing e¤ects on the steady-state
level of distance to frontier. On the one hand, a larger  stimulates domestic innovation
 and FDI f implying a positive e¤ect on a. On the other hand, it discourages e¢ cient
imitation e implying a negative e¤ect on a.
3 Stage-dependent IPR protection
The growth rate of technology in the developing country at time t is
gt  At
At 1
  1 = pt g

at 1
+ t, (28)
where pt = ft + (1   ft)et. This equation shows that for a backward country (i.e., a small
at 1), obtaining foreign technologies through pt (i.e., FDI and e¢ cient imitation) is relatively
important for achieving a higher growth rate. In contrast, for an advanced country (i.e., a
large at 1), domestic innovation t becomes relatively important. Di¤erentiating (28) with
respect to pt yields
@gt
@pt
=
g
at 1
  ()
1=( 1)
(   1)(1  pt)( 2)=( 1) , (29)
@2gt
@p2t
=   ()
1=( 1)(   2)
(   1)2(1  pt)1+( 2)=( 1) < 0. (30)
30(P2) also implies g > , which guarantees convergence.
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The second-order condition implies that the growth rate gt in the developing country is
globally concave in pt, whereas the rst-order condition implies a growth-maximizing p
g
t
given by
pgt = 1 

()1=( 1)
(   1)
at 1
g
( 1)=( 2)
2 (0; 1), (31)
which is decreasing in at 1 and increasing in g. To see that p
g
t > 0 for any at 1 < 1,
g >
()1=( 1)
(1  p)( 2)=( 1) >
()1=( 1)
(   1) >
()1=( 1)
(   1) at 1, (32)
where the rst inequality follows from (P2), and the second inequality follows from 1  p <
(   1)( 1)=( 2), where  > 2.
Because pt = ft + (1   ft)et 2 [f; 1], the following parameter condition ensures that
there exists a value of t 2 (0;1) that equates pt = pgt .
f <
pgt

. (P3)
In other words, the growth-maximizing pgt can be mapped into a unique level of growth-
maximizing patent strength gt that is increasing in at 1 because pt is monotonically de-
creasing in t given (P1). Intuitively, patent protection has an inverted-U e¤ect on economic
growth as discussed before, and the growth-maximizing level of patent protection increases
as the developing country evolves toward the world technology frontier. This nding of a
stage-dependent growth-maximizing patent protection is driven by the property that the
relative importance between foreign technologies and domestic innovation on the developing
countrys growth rate changes endogenously as it evolves towards the world technology fron-
tier. Also, it is interesting to note that in the case of an increase in g, pgt increases and 
g
t
decreases for a given at 1. Intuitively, when the technology frontier grows at a faster rate, it
is more e¢ cient for the developing country to imitate foreign technologies than to invest in
domestic innovation by implementing a weaker patent system.
Proposition 5 As a developing country evolves towards the world technology frontier, the
growth-maximizing patent strength increases over time. In addition, for a given stage of de-
velopment, the growth-maximizing patent strength is decreasing in the growth rate of frontier
technology.
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3.1 Quantitative analysis
As for the welfare-maximizing patent strength, we consider a government that chooses t as
a function of at 1 to maximize aggregate welfare of current and future individuals given byP1
t=1 
t 1Ut, where Ut 
R
ujtdj. The assumption of risk neutrality implies that aggregate
welfare of individuals at time t is simply given by aggregate consumption at time t (i.e.,
Ut = Ct). Substituting (20) - (24) into (25) yields
Ct = [(1  2)pt   t]gAt 1 +

(1  2)  (t)

(1 + t)
  t

(1 + t)At 1, (33)
where t  (1  ft)t(et)2=(2e) + ftt(t)2=(2) + ft(1  ts). The governments objective
is
max
t
1X
t=1
t 1Ct = A0max
t
1X
t=1
[(1 + g)]t 1 ct, (34)
where ct  Ct=At 1. Using (33), we can rearrange terms to obtain
ct = [(1  2)pt   t]g +

(1  2)  (t)

(1 + t)
  t

(1 + t)at 1. (35)
Given (34) and (35), we can solve for the socially optimal policy as a time-invariant dynamic
programming, using the following Bellman equation.
v(at 1) = max
t
ct + (1 + g
)v(at), (36)
where the law of motion for at is given by (26). Substituting (26) and (35) into (36), we
derive an expression only in at 1, parameters, and policy variable t. Given the analytical
complexity of this problem, we consider a numerical approach (described in Appendix A) to
simulate the welfare-maximizing path of patent strength ut .
To facilitate the simulation, we calibrate the parameters using empirical moments, such
as labor share, output growth, consumption and FDI of the Chinese economy. The model fea-
tures the following parameters fg; ; ; s; ; e; ; f ; g and variables fat 1;tg. We consider
20 years in a generation. For the (inverse) distance-to-frontier variable, we set at 1 = 0:11 to
capture the relative labor productivity between China and the US in 2005. For the growth
rate of frontier technologies, we set g = (1 + 1:5%)20   1 to capture the long-run average
annual TFP growth rate in the US. For the discount factor, we set  to match an annual
discount rate of 10% to ensure that utility is bounded despite the high growth rate in China.
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For the labor share 1 , we set  to 0.6 to match the 40% labor share of GDP in China.31
For the prot-sharing parameter between foreign rms and domestic imitative rms, we set
s = 0:5 as a benchmark and also consider s 2 f0; 1g for robustness check. For the innovation
parameter, we set  = 1 as a benchmark and also consider other values  2 f0:5; 2g for
robustness check. For the imitation parameters, we set e = 1 and consider the symmetric
case of  = e as a benchmark, but we also consider  2 f0:5e; 2eg for robustness check. For
the FDI parameter, we set f = 9. Finally, for the curvature parameter in the innovation cost
function, we set  = 5. Given these parameter values, the optimal value of ut evaluated at
at 1 = 0:11 is 0.053. With this complete set of parameter values, we can then compute the
following moments from the model and compare them to the data of the Chinese economy.
We nd that from the model, the annual growth rate of output is 7.5%, consumption as
a share of GDP is 0.49, and FDI as a share of GDP is 0.032. These calibrated moments
are in line with the data on China from the Penn World Table and the World Development
Indicators.
Using the above parameter values, we simulate the optimal path of IPR policy ut and
nd that it is increasing in at 1. This nding is also robust to other parameter values.
Hence, these numerical simulations indicate that our theoretical prediction on the growth-
maximizing policy also applies to the welfare-maximizing policy. In Figure 2, we show our
benchmark simulation outcome.
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Figure 2 - Optimal IPR Policy
31See for example Luo and Zhang (2010) for data on labor share in China.
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3.2 Extension: transfer of foreign technologies
In this subsection, we consider an extension of the baseline model. Specically, we consider
the case in which frontier technologies and also previously developed technologies that have
not been adopted by the domestic economy are both important sources of technology transfer.
In this case, we modify (6) to
bAt(i) = eAt(i) + gAt 1 + (At 1   At 1), (37)
where At 1   At 1 is the distance between frontier and domestic levels of technology, and
 > 0 is a parameter determining the importance of this channel of technology transfer.
Under this specication, (16) becomes
At = pt[g
At 1 + (A

t 1   At 1)] + (1 + t)At 1, (38)
where pt = [ft+(1  ft)et]. In other words, in addition to the average productivity improve-
ment by tAt 1 in all industries, a fraction pt of the industries experiences an additional
productivity gain by gAt 1 + (A

t 1   At 1) through either FDI or e¢ cient imitation.
Rearranging terms, we derive from (38) the growth rate of the domestic economy given by
gt  At
At 1
  1 = pt(g
 + )
at 1
+ t   pt. (39)
Di¤erentiating gt with respect to pt yields
@gt
@pt
=
g + 
at 1
  ()
1=( 1)
(   1)(1  pt)( 2)=( 1)   . (40)
Therefore, @2gt=@(pt)2 < 0 continues to be given by (30) as before. Setting @gt=@pt = 0 in
(40) yields the growth-maximizing pgt given by
pgt = 1 

()1=( 1)
(   1)
at 1
g + (1  at 1)
( 1)=( 2)
, (41)
which continues to be decreasing in at 1 and increasing in g. Given that pt = [ft+(1 ft)et]
remains the same as in section 2 and is strictly decreasing in t, there exists a unique level
of growth-maximizing patent strength gt that is increasing in at 1 and decreasing in g
 as
before.
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4 Empirical evidence
In the theoretical analysis, our main result of stage-dependent optimal IPR policy is driven
by an important property that the positive growth e¤ect of IPR strengthens relative to
the negative growth e¤ect as a country evolves towards the technology frontier; in this
section, we consider cross-country data to establish empirical evidence for these e¤ects. In
the empirical literature, it is well known that the growth e¤ects of IPR protection di¤er
across developed and developing countries; see for example Park (2008b) for a survey. In
the following empirical framework, instead of treating developed and developing countries
as separate groups, we use a distance-to-frontier variable to capture the degree of economic
development as a continuous variable and nd that it indeed has an interactive e¤ect with
IPR on economic growth.
Specically, we consider an unbalanced panel from 1970 to 2005 for 92 countries.32 We
obtain data on labor productivity relative to the US (i.e., US relative productivity is normal-
ized to one) from the Penn World Table, and this variable, relative labor productivity (RLP),
inversely measures the distance to frontier. To capture the strength of IPR, we consider the
standard Ginarte-Park index of patent rights, which is available with one observation every
5 years for each country. We consider the following empirical specication.
growthi;t+1 = 0 + 1IPRi;t + 2IPRi;t RLPi;t + 3RLPi;t +  i;t + "i;t,
where growthi;t+1 is the growth rate of per capita GDP in country i, that is lnGDPi;t+1  
lnGDPi;t. Vector i;t denotes standard control variables including (a) education measured
by the average years of schooling from the Barro-Lee data set, (b) the degree of openness
measured by the sum of export and import over GDP from the Penn World Table, (c) an
index of economic freedom from the annual report of Economic Freedom of the World, (d)
country xed e¤ects and (e) period xed e¤ects. Di¤erentiating growth with respect to IPR,
we have
@growthi;t+1
@IPRi;t
= 1 + 2RLPi;t.
Our main nding is that 1 < 0 and 2 > 0. In other words, for a country that is far
away from the world technology frontier (i.e., a small RLPi;t), the e¤ect of IPR on growth is
negative. For a country that is close to the world technology frontier (i.e., a large RLPi;t),
the e¤ect of IPR on growth becomes positive.
We have considered a number of estimation techniques. The results are summarized in
Table 1, in which the dependent variable is growthi;t+1.
32We include all countries with available data for each variable in at least some years during this period.
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The rst column of Table 1 reports the coe¢ cients of the country xed e¤ects estimation,
whereas the second column also includes period e¤ects, which may reect technical progress
and business cycle components common to all countries, in addition to the persistent country-
specic aspects such as geography, institutions, and initial e¢ ciencies. Both country and
period xed e¤ects are jointly signicant with p-value lower than 1%. Similarly, country
dummies are signicant given period dummies, and period dummies are signicant given
country dummies. We have also performed Hausman tests based on the di¤erence between
xed e¤ects and random e¤ects, which reject the random e¤ects specication at less than
1% signicance. To partially correct for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables, we
have also reported in the third column the 2-stage least square coe¢ cients for which the
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instruments are the lagged independent variables. Neither the signs nor the magnitude of
the coe¢ cients change much.
We have also undertaken dynamic panel estimations, in which the dependent variable
is lnGDPi;t, while lnGDPi;t 1 is one of the regressors, along with IPRi;t 1, RLPi;t 1,
IPRi;t 1  RLPi;t 1, and other controls. In this formulation, the growth rate is implic-
itly obtained as lnGDPi;t   lnGDPi;t 1. As well known since Caselli et al. (1996), in this
kind of dynamic panel growth regressions there are serious omitted variable and endogeneity
problems. Most notably, the current value of lnGDPi;t is explained by its lagged value,
lnGDPi;t 1, which is necessarily correlated with the fully persistent country xed e¤ects33.
Moreover, most of the other explanatory variables are typically endogenous or predetermined
(see Caselli et al. 1996). Both problems lead to biased and inconsistent OLS estimators, and
this issue is commonly addressed by estimating rst-di¤erenced equations and instrumenting
the rst di¤erences of the endogenous right hand side variables with the levels of the vari-
ables lagged two periods and more, and using GMM. We have undertaken regressions using
di¤erent versions of the Arellano and Bonds (1991) rst-di¤erenced GMM estimators which
in general conrm our main results. However, this estimator, may not perform well if vari-
ables are persistent, as remarked by Bond et al. (2001), because the lagged levels are weak
instruments for future rst-di¤erences34. In this case, Blundell and Bonds (1998) system
GMM estimator35 is a more appropriate estimator36. Since all our variables are very persis-
tent37, we have undertaken Blundell and Bonds (1998) system GMM estimations in order
to check for robustness. As the reader can see38, despite the dynamic panel specication,
the coe¢ cients of the main explanatory variables, which are reported in the fourth column
of Table 1, are roughly in line with those of the static panel regressions of the rst three
columns. The diagnostic tests are as expected,with overidentication restrictions accepted
33This is a case of the general dynamic panel bias highlighted by Nickell (1981).
34In our attempts with Arellano and Bond (1991) rst-di¤erenced GMM regressions, once eliminating
instrument proliferation using STATAs collapse command and all possible lag restrictions, we have always
obtained lagged per capita GDP coe¢ cients that are lower than those of the corresponding Within Groups
estimators, which is known to be biased downward. This is a powerful tool to detect bias in rst-di¤erenced
GMM, as recommended in the growth literature by Bond et al. (2001).
35This estimator complements Arellano and Bond (1991) rst-di¤erenced GMM by instrumenting the level
equations using the lagged rst-di¤erences of the series, as suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995).
36A relevant point has been made by Bobba and Coviello (2007) regarding the positive e¤ect of education
on democracy, visible in the system GMM analysis rather than in the di¤erence GMM analysis (in Acemoglu
et al., 2005).
37The unit root is accepted for all variables in almost all the panel unit root tests we have undertaken.
38We have used STATA command xtabond2 for the dynamic panel regressions. STATA outputs are
available upon request. We have used the two-step robust options adjusted for small samples, and with
orthogonal deviations (recommended for unbalanced panels). The reported estimates used lag(2 3) collapse
to avoid instrument proliferation, but they are remarkably stable to alternative lag restrictions over all the
available range.
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by Sargan test and Hansen test - as are accepted the (not reported) Di¤erence-in-Hansen
tests of the exogeneity of the instruments - and with Arellano-Bond tests rejecting the null of
no rst-order serial correlation and accepting the null of no-second-order serial correlation.
Finally, the residuals of all our regressions have been tested for unit roots, which are always
excluded at less than 1% signicance.
Therefore we conclude by saying that the available cross-country evidence seems to ro-
bustly suggest that the benecial growth e¤ect of IPR strengthens relative to the negative
e¤ect as a country evolves towards the world technological frontier. This nding provides
empirical evidence for the IPR and growth mechanics highlighted in our theoretical model.
5 Discussion
In this study, we have developed a simple Schumpeterian growth model of distance to frontier
to analyze the evolution of IPR protection in developing countries. Although our model is
stylized, we believe that it captures the essence of the key issue that is the interrelation
between economic development and optimal IPR protection. Specically, an appropriate
IPR system contributes to the economic development of a country, which in turn determines
the optimal level of IPR protection in the country at a given development stage. In summary,
we nd that the optimal strength of IPR protection increases as a developing country evolves
towards the world technology frontier, and this theoretical nding of stage-dependent IPR
protection is consistent with the actual evolution of the IPR system in China and supported
by our empirical results.
In terms of policy implications, our nding suggests that it is optimal for a developing
country to gradually strengthen its IPR protection. In other words, requiring a developing
country, such as China, to immediately raise its level of patent protection on par with
developed countries would hurt its social welfare. In a National Academy of Sciences report,
Merrill et al. (2004, p. 13) state that "patents exist in most countries, and the degree to which
countries at di¤erent stages of economic development should adhere to the same standards of
patentability, conform to the same rules, and follow the same administrative procedures is an
enormously complex although extremely important set of issues. [...] readers should not infer
that what we recommend for the United States we believe less-developed countries should
adopt." Our nding of stage-dependant IPR policy reiterates their concern and provides a
justication for the WTOs procedure that when the TRIPS Agreement was implemented in
developed countries in 1996, developing countries and least developed countries were given
an extension of 4 years and 11 years respectively to apply the agreements provisions.
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Finally, in the theoretical model, we consider a developing country that takes the world
technology frontier as given. Although it is arguable that technological progress in developed
countries may be a¤ected by the level of IPR protection in developing countries, it is still an
open debate among existing studies (cited in the introduction) as to whether Southern IPR
protection has a positive or negative e¤ect on Northern innovation. Therefore, we leave this
important but controversial issue to future research.
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Appendix A: Numerical solution of the optimal IPR policy
Recall that the governments objective is
max
t
1X
t=1
t 1Ct = A0max
t
1X
t=1
[(1 + g)]t 1 ct,
where ct is given by (35). Given the analytical complexity of this problem, we consider a
numerical approach to solve for the welfare-maximizing path of patent strength. In our nu-
merical analysis, we simulate numerically the value function, v(at 1), and the policy function
G(at 1)  t, adopting a standard value-function iteration method, according to which39:
1. We select a grid of points40 for [0; 1], i.e. the state space of ai, where now i 2 1; :::; N
indexes the i-th point in the grid (not time);
2. We start from an initial guess41 of v0(a);
3. We obtain numerical solutions for
v1i = max
i
ci + (1 + g
)v0(ai)
for all i 2 1; :::; N ;
4. We obtain a (cubic) polynomial spline approximation of v1(a) such that v1(ai) = v1i;
5. We iterate this procedure, this time starting from the new function v1(ai), obtaining
v2i = max
i
ci + (1 + g
)v1(ai)
for all i 2 1; :::; N ;
6. Obtain a polynomial spline approximation of v2(a) such that v2(ai) = v2i: this is
necessary for the maximization to take place in the continuous space [0; 1], thereby admitting
solutions for i corresponding to values of a not necessarily in the chosen grid42;
7. We keep repeating the maximization and approximation, until the change in vni and
in the policy variables does not exceed a tolerance value43.
39All computations have been performed using Matlab. The .m les used are available upon request.
40This number is N = 40 in our simulations.
41Identically equal to zero.
42Otherwise v1(ai) would not be dened.
43of 10 4, and the number of iterations do not exceed a maximum number of loops, set equal to 80 in our
simulations.
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